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Abstract. Pico is a user authentication system that does not require
remembering secrets. It is based on a personal handheld token that holds
the user’s credentials and that is unlocked by a “personal aura” generated
by digital accessories worn by the owner. The token, acting as prover,
engages in a public-key-based authentication protocol with the verifier.
What would happen to Pico if success of the mythical quantum computer
meant secure public key primitives were no longer available, or if for
other reasons such as energy consumption we preferred not to deploy
them? More generally, what would happen under those circumstances
to user authentication on the web, which relies heavily on public key
cryptography through HTTPS/TLS?
Although the symmetric-key-vs-public-key debate dates back to the 1990s,
we note that the problematic aspects of public key deployment that were
identified back then are still ubiquitous today. In particular, although
public key cryptography is widely deployed on the web, revocation still
doesn’t work.
We discuss ways of providing desirable properties of public-key-based
user authentication systems using symmetric-key primitives and tamper-
evident tokens. In particular, we present a protocol through which a
compromise of the user credentials file at one website does not require
users to change their credentials at that website or any other.
We also note that the current prototype of Pico, when working in compat-
ibility mode through the Pico Lens (i.e. with websites that are unaware
of the Pico protocols), doesn’t actually use public key cryptography,
other than that implicit in TLS. With minor tweaks we adopt this as the
native mode for Pico, dropping public key cryptography and achieving
much greater deployability without any noteworthy loss in security.
1 Introduction: a motivating story
In 2013, an Adobe authentication server was famously broken into [1]. Conse-
quently, every one of the 150+ million customers whose credentials were leaked
was forced to change their password. Why? There are several reasons, some
resulting from Adobe’s carelessness and others that are more fundamental.
Authors’ preprint of 2015-06-30.
Final version to appear in Proceedings of Passwords 2014, Springer LNCS.
Adobe’s sins in this affair are numerous and have been widely publicized. To
begin with, although the passwords were encrypted4, password hints were stored
in plaintext next to each password. The fields stored in the database for each
password included the following:
– User ID
– Username
– Email
– Password (the only encrypted field)
– Password hint
If I chose an especially stupid hint (such as “try qwerty123”, which actually
occurs in the leaked data), my password would now be known to the attackers.
But, with an easy password (such as “12345678”, which also occurs many times
in the leaked data), even if my own hint wasn’t totally stupid I would probably
be in trouble: if my password was insufficiently original, so that several other
people among those 150 millions of victims also happened to choose it, then
chances are that someone else provided a stupid hint for it. If so, because the
passwords were encrypted with ECB and without salt, the attacker could read
off the stupid hint from one of them and apply it to all the other passwords that
encrypted to the same ciphertext. Moreover, even if no hint obviously exposed
the group of people who shared my easy password, if thousands of others share
my “12345678” stroke of genius, chances are it’s one of the handful of popular
passwords5 that are well known from many other leaks and that attackers try
before all others.
So let’s stop flogging the Adobe dead horse. Assume that some imaginary
site, say bettersite.com, had hashed and salted its passwords, as should be
best practice ever since Morris and Thompson’s 1979 landmark paper [2], and
that they imposed a password policy requesting uppercase, lowercase, digits and
so forth in order to enforce diversity and prevent those easily guessed common
passwords. Then, first of all the policy does not even let you use a really terrible
password such as “12345678”; second, even if you do pick an easily guessed pass-
word that is chosen by thousands of other clueless users, thanks to the salt it
will appear in the credentials database as thousands of different salted hashes, so
that the attackers can’t tell that thousands of people share that same password,
nor which ones of them do. It is true, however, that the attackers can still try the
most likely guesses that fit the policy. Chances are they’ll find that user John
chose his dog’s name and birth year: “Bella2008” complies with the policy but
can be guessed relatively easily in an offline search. So, when their credentials file
is compromised, the operators of bettersite.com still have to ask each of their
customers to change their password. This is not merely because the attacker
4 Reversibly encrypted with 3DES, not salted and hashed as they should have been.
To add the insult to the injury, the encryption was performed by treating each block
independently, in ECB mode.
5 Splashdata publish an annual list: the most recent one at the time of writing is
http://splashdata.com/press/worst-passwords-of-2014.htm.
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could otherwise log into John’s account at bettersite.com, but also because,
knowing many people’s propensity for reusing the same memorable password on
several sites, the attacker will now try “Bella2008” at John’s accounts on Ama-
zon, Ebay, Google and so forth. So John had better change that password on all
the other sites where he used it6.
But perhaps the most annoyed user of bettersite.com would be Emily the
Geek, who diligently took all the password recommendations very seriously and
went to the trouble of composing and memorizing a strong password along the
lines of “caeF@#qSFQH?T!@$YF”. Since bettersite.com salted and hashed it,
she is quite safe from guessing attacks, even if the bad guys have a basement full
of graphics cards to devote to their cracking. And yet, when bettersite.com is
hacked, the site operators will still ask Emily to change her password, because
they can’t tell that she had a strong one and shouldn’t have to change it7. That’s
really unfair towards her, after she went to so much trouble, and more so because
we know it’s quite unnecessary.
Would life not be so much better if websites accepted public keys instead of
passwords? Neither John nor Emily would have to change their credential at the
compromised website nor at any other, even if they gave their same public key
to every site. By stealing a file of public keys, the attackers would not be in a
position to impersonate any of the users anywhere—neither at the attacked site
nor, a fortiori, elsewhere. This alone looks like a strong incentive for websites to
accept public keys instead of passwords.
So let’s imagine moving to public keys instead of passwords for user au-
thentication. That was Pico’s original plan [3]. With that strategy, stealing the
credentials file does not in itself compromise any accounts. The website does not
have to force any password (or private key) resets in the event of a breach and,
perhaps more importantly, doesn’t make front page news of the Financial Times
with the consequent drop in share price.
There is one additional benefit of adopting public keys instead of passwords
for user authentication: assuming (as is common practice with, for example,
PGP) that Emily encrypted her private key with a passphrase, then even an
attacker who got her public key by hacking into bettersite.com would not be
6 This may not be part of the advice John receives from bettersite.com when they
ask him to change his password there, since they have no incentive about protecting
his other accounts, despite the fact that it is the leak at their site that has made
John vulnerable to fraud elsewhere. But they might argue that it was John’s reuse
of his password that put him at risk and that, since he contravened their advice
against it, it was his fault. We do not condone this buck-passing, since demanding
that users remember complex and distinct passwords for each site is unreasonable
in the first place.
7 A better designed password mechanism should blacklist all passwords that have
appeared in a document, at least as far as the maintainers of the system are able to
figure out. If they knew about this paper, for example, then even Emily’s password
would no longer be acceptable. VAX/VMS, developed in the 1970s, rejected all of
the password examples that appeared in its own documentation.
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in a position to verify any guesses of her passphrase (unless he also obtained her
encrypted private key from her computer). But this is an aside.
Another aside is that Pico’s unconventional strategy of using a different pub-
lic key for each website that Emily visits, rather than the same one for all, gives
Emily an extra privacy advantage: even colluding websites cannot correlate her
visits8.
Someone might however object that these benefits (no accounts compromised
if credentials file stolen, etc etc) don’t really derive from public key cryptography
but from the fact that we’re now using unguessable credentials. The core of this
objection9 is that, if one could assume the availability of the same mechanisms on
which Pico relies, namely tamper-evident tokens to hold the principals’ secrets,
then one could offer the same benefits without using public keys at all.
This paper explores this alternative and its accompanying trade-offs.
2 Objective
We like the crucial property, which Pico has, that a compromise of the credentials
file at Adobe does not expose the accounts at Facebook; or, more strongly, that
the compromise of one website does not expose any credentials that could be used
for future login, whether at that same website or at any others. We wish to offer
this property without using public key cryptography. Why? Perhaps because the
mythical quantum computer might one day break public key cryptography. Or
perhaps, less dramatically, because in mobile and wearable computing we want
to conserve battery energy while performing user authentication. Or maybe for
yet another practical reason related to deployability, as we shall see in section 5.
We assume that users (and websites) have tamper-evident tokens that can
securely remember as many high-entropy secrets as needed.
3 The core idea
The basic idea is very simple. Assume the website has the decency of salting
and hashing the passwords properly10. For each website, the user’s token picks
a different, strong and totally random password of generous length11 and re-
members it. The user never has to type it or even see it12. The strong password
8 This corresponds to having different passwords for the different site, but without
Emily having to remember them because the Pico does that for her.
9 Which was the germ of the discussion among the first three authors that eventually
resulted in this paper.
10 Although we know that this often doesn’t happen, as documented by Bonneau and
Preibusch [4].
11 Unfortunately inconsistency between password policies may frustrate this. Some
websites reject strong passwords on spurious grounds such as suggesting that they
are too long. Our PMF specification [5] addresses this issue, as briefly summarized
in “Level 2” in section 5.1.
12 Some people, but not us, no longer call this a password, because users can’t remember
it. Note that, if the attacker can perform any industrial-sized number of guessing
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is only stored in salted and hashed form, so it can’t feasibly be guessed: even
though the attacker could verify a correct guess, the search space is too large.
The compromise of the credentials file therefore does not expose any passwords
and does not affect the attacked site nor any other sites. If “legacy users” (with
human-remembered and thus guessable passwords) coexist with “secure users”
(with strong random passwords that are too long and complex to remember in a
brain, but which a tamper-evident token remembers for them), then, so long as
the website can tell which is which, in case of compromise only the legacy users
need be required to reset their password.
In fact we have already taken this route with Pico when we implemented the
compatibility mode we presented at this workshop last year [6], which essentially
transforms Pico into a password manager in your pocket. Since then, we have
enhanced our system with the “Password Manager Friendly” (PMF) specification
for websites [5]. The changes at the website side to achieve PMF compliance are
minimal13 but they allow Pico (as well as any other password manager, whether
stand-alone or embedded in a browser) to reliably create and submit a strong
uncrackable password for the website without user intervention, and of course
to adopt a different one for every website. PMF almost14 removes the need for
the public-key protocol (Sigma-I [7]) originally used by Pico, so long as the Pico
has a secure channel15 over which to send the password to the website.
3.1 A small leftover problem
The last point we just mentioned needs further attention. How can the user,
or the user’s tamper-evident token, send the strong password to the website?
attempts offline, most passwords that the average user will actually remember are
vulnerable.
13 They consist essentially of a set of semantic labels for the HTML of the login form,
saying in a machine-readable format that this is a login form, this field is the user-
name, this field is the password and so on. The HTML5 specification contains some-
thing similar and some web browsers recognise this. For example, you may specify
a policy that when web forms are cached any password fields are omitted from the
data that is cached.
14 Why “almost”? Because, with public key, there is the additional benefit that the
website cannot impersonate the user. This does not affect accounts at other sites if
the user adopts a different password for each, but it does affect logins at the site
itself. Without public key, the website, which on exit from the TLS tunnel receives
the user’s password in plaintext even though it is not supposed to store it other than
salted and hashed, could pretend to a third party that the user authenticated at
other times. With public key, it would not be able to produce evidence of any other
logins than the ones in which the user actually replied correctly to the challenge. As
with other arguments in favour of public key, this one too becomes problematic once
the possibility of revocation is accounted for. It should also be noted that a better
web login scheme would allow the prover to demonstrate knowledge of the shared
secret without revealing it—cfr “Level 3” in section 5.1.
15 In this context, secure means offering confidentiality, freshness and authenticity of
source and destination.
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In Pico, even in compatibility mode, that’s done using the TLS channel that
protects the HTTPS login page. But that itself uses public key cryptography. If
we want a solution that completely avoids public key, we must use an alternative.
This is not a problem specific to Pico: the scope is much broader. If we assume
we can’t use public key crypto, how does the web work? How do we do HTTPS?
How can a user communicate securely with (let alone log into) a website that
they have never seen before16?
The rest of the paper will pursue two threads. First (section 4) we revisit the
problem of web login without public key technology, which will become topical
again if quantum computers become capable of factoring numbers a little larger
than 3*5. Next (section 5) we sketch an alternative architecture for Pico that
uses as little public key technology as possible, pointing out its advantages and
disadvantages compared to the previous design.
4 Web login without public keys
The technology for establishing secure connections with unknown principals
without using public key cryptography is well-known (Needham-Schroeder [8],
then upgraded to Kerberos [9]). Whereas, with public key, the client can contact
the website directly and check the validity of the site’s public key certificate,
with symmetric key you need an introducer (the Key Distribution Centre, or
KDC) with whom both parties share (separate) secrets.
The symmetric key faction will be quick to point out that this requirement
is no worse than with public key, because there you need an introducer too: the
Certification Authority that signed the website’s public key.
The opposite faction will now object that, without public key, the introducer
(Kerberos authentication server) must be online, so public key is better because
it does not require that of its introducer (the Certification Authority).
The symmetric key faction will then ask how their opponents deal with the
case in which a private key has been compromised and a public key must there-
fore be revoked. If you need to check for revocation online at every login, that’s
no better than having to talk to the Kerberos KDC at every login. And, if you
don’t do that, you only have the illusion of superiority while instead you’re vul-
nerable for a time window whose length depends on the expiration frequency of
the issued certificates.
These issues and trade-offs were extensively discussed in the 1990s, mostly
as debates at crypto conferences, but remarkably little of this discussion seems
to have been published for posterity in the open literature, if we except a discus-
16 Note that we are not even beginning to address the even more complex human
factors problem that the average user can’t understand the difference between the
HTTPS padlock in the address bar (whose appearance changes between browsers
and between versions of the same browser anyway) and a bitmap of a padlock in the
client area of the page, and can therefore be phished.
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sion by Christianson, Crispo and Malcolm [10] in a previous Security Protocols
Workshop17.
So let’s have a closer look at how revocation is handled on the web today,
twenty years later.
4.1 Revocation on the web today
Once credentials are suspected (or known) to have been compromised, they must
be revoked and replaced with new ones. This tends to be a weak point in many
systems. Even deployed ones. Even on the web as we know it today.
In the original Pico system [3], each Pico token follows the unconventional
strategy of using a separate key pair for each website it talks to, which makes
it relatively easy for the Pico to know whom to contact if revocation is needed.
On the TLS-based web, instead, in which a website offers a public key to all its
correspondents (the traditional way of using a public key), it is this widespread
sharing of the public key that makes revocation hard. When a principal uses
the same public key for all correspondents, and this public key is distributed
promiscuously18, then, when this public key is revoked, the principal can never
be sure of having warned all correspondents that the previously used public key
should no longer be used. This is particularly true for future correspondents,
who might begin to use a previously known-good public key without awareness
that it has meanwhile been revoked.
In today’s web, it’s usually only the website that offers a public key to the
client, and not vice versa, because client certificates are not commonly used.
As we noted, the website’s public key is hard to revoke because many corre-
spondents use it, whereas the Pico uses a different credential for every website
(regardless of whether it is a public key, in native mode, or a strong password, in
compatibility mode) and that makes credentials relatively easy to revoke. If you
lose (or discover evidence of tampering on) the tamper-evident device, rather
than the individual credential, then you need to revoke all the keys (or pass-
17 It was a common discussion theme at conferences such as Oakland in the mid-1990s,
and the subject was also discussed by the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Privacy Task Force in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s. It was widely understood that
both symmetric key set-up cost and public key revocation cost were of order k logN
with N counterparties in the case of hierarchical servers. Possibly for economic rea-
sons the early CAs pushed for short certificate life, rather than effective revocation
mechanisms, contributing to the rather unsatisfactory situation that we have today.
Interestingly, version 1 of the SWIFT protocol used a trusted logger in conjunction
with symmetric keys to prevent message forgery, and 3GPP has a current Generic
Authentication Architecture that is based on symmetric-key. The authors would be
delighted to hear from any readers who are aware of other publications that address
in a measured way the trade-offs between symmetric and public key in the presence
of revocation.
18 For example via public key certificates propagating in an uncontrolled way.
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words) it contained and that’s a pain19. But at least you have the exact list
of the correspondents you should contact. The website doesn’t even have that
luxury, because the same public key is used by all clients—including the future
clients that the website doesn’t even know about.
In today’s web, for the website, revocation essentially doesn’t work. What
happens? A site gets hacked, as happened to Adobe. It had a public key cer-
tificate valid until next year, but it makes itself a new key pair because the
hackers, who exfiltrated the passwords file, might have done the same with the
private key. If the website does not revoke its public key then the attackers, who
have grabbed the old key pair and have a still valid CA-signed certificate for the
public key, can impersonate the website to any client whose connection they can
man-in-the-middle20.
There are essentially two alternatives to prevent this attack, essentially cor-
responding to client pull and server push respectively.
The first alternative is for the client to check every certificate with the CA to
see if this is still valid, as per the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [11].
This adds latency and introduces brittleness: what should the client do if it can’t
contact the CA, either because of non-malicious network errors or because of a
purposeful denial of service? If the client is paranoid and rejects the connection
to Adobe whenever it can’t contact the CA, essentially the web stops working,
as per Leslie Lamport’s old adage that “a distributed system is one in which
the failure of a computer you didn’t even know existed can render your own
computer unusable”; if instead the client accepts the connection anyway, then
impersonation attacks go through21.
The second alternative is for the Certification Authority to regularly push a
certificate revocation list to all clients; but, to reduce the vulnerability window,
this requires frequent updates (say daily), which are costly in terms of bandwidth
and downtime regardless of whether any impersonation attacks are taking place,
and it creates an incentive for attackers to DDOS the CA.
19 As well as a privacy concern—because a global observer can now link your inter-
actions with the various websites to which your Pico issues revocation requests by
their timing and network origin.
20 Note also that there are often more than two parties involved in a session. I may
authenticate Amazon when I buy a book, but the part of the transaction I really
care about is the payment via my bank. Unfortunately the current protocol requires
Amazon to protect my credit card details so I should check the revocation status of
Amazon’s certificate. A better protocol would allow me to send an encrypted bundle
to Amazon (running the risk that it isn’t Amazon) which instructs my bank to pay
Amazon (say) £20. Only the bank, not Amazon, should be able to decrypt that
bundle.
21 There is an alternative that is used in many financial networks. The decision to
check for revocation might depend upon the value of the transaction. When buying
a coffee I might neglect to check revocation status, accepting the risk. When ordering
a new television I might insist on checking the status because the value at risk is
higher. However this assumes a protocol that prevents the coffee shop from reusing
my credentials to buy a television.
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Neither of these options is desirable and therefore, in practice, with TLS, in-
valid certificates are not revoked22. New certificates are served but compromised
keys have certificates that still appear as valid; therefore impersonation attacks
remain possible23.
4.2 TLS without public key, but with revocation
If we used symmetric key technologies to implement TLS, how would it work?
And how would it deal with revocation? We need a Key Distribution Centre, that
is to say an authentication server that can do introductions. In the e-commerce
context, payment organizations such as Visa or Paypal are third parties known
to and (of necessity) trusted by both the user and the website, so we might
imagine that they could serve as introducers. Why would they? If the web trans-
action involved a payment, they might ask for a small percentage. If it didn’t,
they might ask for a micropayment—perhaps merely the ability to display an
advertisement—or, maybe better, they might request a small fee from the web-
site (which probably profits indirectly from the visit even when it does not charge
the user). The first time a user visits a website, Visa or equivalent provides an
introduction and an initial session key. On subsequent visits, the user and the
website already have a shared secret and they can bootstrap further security
from that24.
How could revocation work in this architecture? After the very first contact
between client and website via the third-party introduction, the client and the
website should negotiate and agree two revocation codes (one each for the client
and the website) to be used when needed, as part of an emergency transaction
initiated by either party that revokes the current shared key and ideally installs a
replacement one. For convenience of exposition, we primarily describe revocation
initiated from the website side in what follows.
To set a baseline for comparison, we first outline what occurs in the public key
case25. The revocation code for the website could consist of SK−w [Revoke,K
+
w ] or
even just of K−w itself. Ideally the original key certificate for K+w would contain
22 It is interesting to note that browser makers can decide individually on the pol-
icy they choose, though they compete against each other on security, features and
especially performance.
23 We don’t hear much about such attacks. Is it because they don’t happen and we
shouldn’t worry or because they happen so effectively that we are not aware of them?
24 This design is architecturally plausible but has the potentially undesirable property
that now the client and the website must trust Visa (or equivalent) not just with
their money, but also with the confidentiality and authenticity of all their subsequent
communications with the website. This problem is shared by all KDS mechanisms;
one solution is to combine several keys distributed by mutually mistrusting authen-
tication servers, at the expense of further complexity, latency and potential failure
points.
25 Notation: K+ is a public key and K− is the matching private key. A K without
exponent is a symmetric key. EK+ [m] or EK [m] is the encryption of message m
under key K+ or K respectively, whereas DK− [m] or SK− [m] is the decryption or
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h(K ′+w), a hash of the replacement public key. Note that website revocation is
global, i.e. only one public message is required in order to inform all clients,
whereas client key revocation has to be done individually with each website,
because of our Pico-specific assumption that websites send the same public key
to all their clients, but clients send a different public key to every website.
The revocation transaction does not intrinsically require interaction with any
third party, but (in the shadow of a denial of service attack) it does rely upon
the website having the ability to post the revocation code securely26 in a place
where the client cannot be prevented from looking, and vice versa.
In the symmetric key case, where the shared secret between client C and web-
site W is Kcw after the introduction brokered by the Key Distribution Centre,
website W immediately gives client C the string
R = EKcw [EKw [Revoke,W,K
′
cw]]
where Kw is a master key known only to the website27. As soon as the revocation
string28 R has been passed to the client, website and client immediately replace
Kcw by a new shared secret K0 (constructed by each of them applying a one-way
hash to Kcw) and destroy their copies of Kcw29. The revocation process is for W
to publish Kw, which allows the client to obtain K ′cw and also provokes the client
to cease using all keys based on K0 and replace them with keys derived from
K ′0 = h(K
′
cw). As before, K ′cw can be used to share its successor, K ′′cw encrypted
under K ′w, before K ′cw is deleted. Note that, just as with the public key case,
website revocation is global.
signature, respectively, of message m with key K−. Finally, h(m) is the one-way
hash of message m.
26 The security requirements for posting revocations are surprisingly subtle. Clearly
public visibility, persistence, and integrity of the revocation string all need to be
assured by the publisher, to prevent the attacker from overwriting it. But what about
a denial of service attack where the attacker publishes a bogus revocation string to
prevent the correct principal from publishing the real one? We can’t require the
principal that is revoking their keys to authenticate themselves to the publisher in
any conventional way: after all, the keys are being revoked precisely because they
may have been stolen. One possibility is for the principal to pre-reserve space with
the publisher at an “address” corresponding to a hash of the revocation string, with
the agreement that the publisher will allow only the corresponding pre-image to
be published at that address. Notice that we needn’t care who it is that posts the
legitimate revocation string: revocation strings are supposed to be kept secret from
attackers, so if a revocation string has been stolen then a tamper-evident device has
been compromised, and the corresponding keys therefore need to be revoked anyway.
27 Thus, at that stage, the client cannot decrypt the inner set of brackets
EKw [Revoke,W,K
′
cw] which appears as a blob of gibberish.
28 To avoid confusion: even though we call R a revocation string, this string is necessary
but not sufficient to cause a revocation. It behaves like an inert component until
activated by primer Kw, mentioned next, which is the trigger for the revocation.
29 In the client case, after first decrypting R using Kcw. Forgetting Kcw gives forward
security: a subsequent leak of K0 = h(Kcw) does not reveal Kcw, so even knowing
Kw the attacker still cannot obtain K′cw from R.
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We need to ensure that the new secret (or private) keys are not themselves
compromised by the same attack on secure storage that triggered the revoca-
tion30. For the sake of conceptual clarity, we shall assume in what follows that the
entire website (or at least the authentication and login component) consists of a
single tamper-evident device, which may periodically lose confidentiality and/or
integrity, and then (following detection of the security breach) be restored to
a known secure state on a “new” tamper-evident device prepared (possibly in
advance) offline31. In practice, a multi-layered security architecture at the web-
site is probably more realistic. For example, we could assume the existence at
the website of an even more secure, but less convenient, storage medium that
it would not be practicable to involve in routine transactions. In extremis, this
medium could even be a USB stick in a safe, or hard copy output from a phys-
ically secure logging printer that requires to be typed manually back in as part
of the recovery process.
4.3 Avoiding unnecessary re-registration
Remember that the client’s first step in establishing a fresh session with the
website is to build a leak-proof end-to-end pipe (TLS or its symmetric-key re-
placement), as described in the previous section. Establishing that this pipe has
the correct website at the far end entails an online check by the client that the
website has not been compromised since the previous session32.
The second step (the actual login) is for the website and client to authenticate
to one another, and agree a fresh session key. This process requires the client to
reveal their identity to the website, and so must take place inside a leak-proof
pipe in order to preserve client anonymity. In the public key case, this can be
done using protocols such as Sigma-I [7]. How might we implement these steps
using only symmetric keys?
Let us suppose that the Pico client Alice has generated a root secret xn where
n is a suitably large number, and computed the reversed Lamport hash chain
xi = h(xi+1). The element xi of this chain is the login credential that will be
used in round i to authenticate client Alice to the website33. Some time ago,
during her initial contact with the website W , Alice privately shared x0 with W .
30 In contrast, we don’t need to worry about the attacker learning the revocation codes
as a result of the attack, but we do need to ensure that the principals can still get
access to these codes after the attack has happened.
31 This is similar to the threat model of Yu and Ryan [12].
32 This involves checking for the absence of the appropriate revocation string, both in
the public key and in the symmetric key case. When a key is revoked, the replacement
key is used to share the latest time guaranteed to be before the breach, that is, the
latest time at which the tamper-evident hardware was known to be intact. Sessions
between then and the new pipe build are assumed to be compromised.
33 Prover Alice sends the verifier a succession of xi with increasing i. The verifying
website holds xi from the previous round and cannot derive xi+1 from it, but if
it receives xi+1 it can verify it’s genuine by checking whether h(xi+1) = xi. The
number n is the length of the chain and determines the number of logins that Alice
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It is now several sessions later, and the website currently has the value xi stored
in a table, together with a symmetric key Ki and a randomly chosen number
ti. The value ti is the current pseudonym for Alice, and is used as a key (in the
database sense) to access the authentication table entry corresponding to Alice.
This table entry may contain, or link to, Alice’s actual (persistent) identity, but
need not34.
In the course of the previous session, Alice pre-agreed the new symmetric
key Ki with the website, and this key will be used to establish a leak-proof
pipe for negotiating the new login session that is about to be established, thus
concealing the “password” xi+1 from third parties, including man-in-the-middle
attackers. At the time when Ki was agreed, the website W privately gave Alice
the revocation string EKw [ti] where Kw is a master key known only to W .
Here is the session establishment protocol:
(1) A −→W : EKw [ti];EKi [xi+1]
W first recovers Ki using ti, and then verifies that h(xi+1) = xi.W next chooses
two random strings ti+1 and si, then sets Ki+1 = h(Ki). Now W replies to Alice
with the following message:
(2) W −→ A : EKi [EKw [ti+1], si, xi+1]
W replaces xi with xi+1, ti with ti+1, Ki with Ki+1, and deletes ti and Ki. The
shared keys for the new session between Alice and W are derived from si, and
are deleted on logout when the session ends.
W can work out which client message (1) is from, by decrypting the first
part with Kw, but the attacker can’t do this without first breaching the website
to obtain Kw. The second part of message (1) can only be decrypted using the
key Ki obtained by decrypting the first part. This ensures that only the correct
website can obtain the pre-image xi+1 of the current authentication credential
xi. The fact that this pre-image is correct authenticates the client to the website,
and assures the freshness of both parts of message (1). Message (2) shows knowl-
edge of Ki and xi+1, thus authenticating the website to the client and proving
freshness of message (2)35. Authentication is thus mutual, however the identity
of the client is revealed only to the correct website. Upon receiving the second
message, the client simply replaces Ki with Ki+1 = h(Ki) and deletes Ki.
After the website breach, we cannot prevent the attacker mounting a man-in-
the-middle attack to obtain client session credentials to spoof individual sessions,
any more than we can prevent this in the public key case. Just as in the public
can perform before having to reload the chain. A version of the Guy Fawkes protocol
[13] can be used to refresh x0 when n is exhausted.
34 The table entry accessed by ti will include h(TA), where TA is the revocation string
for Alice. Alice initiates the revocation protocol with W by revealing TA.
35 To allow for the possibility that the two parties might get out of sync, for example
through non-malicious communication errors, we might relax the verification slightly.
If the pre-image check fails, the verifier should hash again for a configurable number
of times. If a match is found, they will have both authenticated and resynchronized.
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key case, the credentials for the leak-proof pipe (i.e. EKw [ti]) will have to change
to the fall-back credentials, using the revocation protocol described in section
4.2. But, just as in the public key case, the attacker gains nothing from the client
that they can use in the longer term. In particular, once the website is re-secured
the client can continue to use the same Lamport hash chain36 without the risk
that the attacker can impersonate her.
We therefore have the property that we wanted to preserve from the public-
key scenario, namely that a compromise of the credentials file at the website
does not require revocation of the client credentials at that site or any other in
order to prevent masquerade attacks subsequent to website recovery37.
5 Pico without public keys
With Pico, we are much more concerned about offering a viable alternative
to remembering and typing passwords than we are about guarding against the
cryptanalitic threat of quantum computers. We assume that, at least in the short
and medium term, password login on the web will continue to rely on TLS. We
are, however, interested in maximizing adoption of Pico. In that spirit, using
login credentials that look like passwords rather than public keys is potentially
a worthy optimization38 because it minimizes the changes required of a website
to achieve Pico compliance.
5.1 Levels of Pico compliance
We define the following scale of possible levels of Pico compliance, with higher
levels promising higher security but requiring greater disruption at the website
end and thus greater difficulty for wide-scale adoption and deployment [14].
Level 0. The Pico compatibility mode we presented last year [6] requires
no changes whatsoever to the website: the client sees a Pico-friendly login page,
rewritten by the Pico lens browser plugin, but the website still receives a tra-
ditional username and password and need not even know that a Pico was used
to log in. This option would in theory provide maximum deployability, if not
for the fact that many websites mess around with Javascript on their login page
and as a result cannot be reliably operated upon by a password manager (or by
Pico) other than by writing ad-hoc heuristics that cater for special cases.
36 Note that the hash chains xi and Ki run in opposite directions. The Lamport hash
chain is xi.
37 Of course, following a second break-in to the website, the attacker will be able to
correlate client identities from the second attack with those stolen from the first.
Just as in the public-key case, clients who wish to prevent this will need to update
their login credentials (x0 or K− in the symmetric and public key cases respectively)
before the second attack. However no third-party mediated authentication is required
for this.
38 Hopefully not merely a Needham optimization: replacing something that works with
something that almost works but is cheaper.
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Level 1. To address this problem we developed the previously-mentioned
PMF specification [5]: concise semantic annotations on the login page allow any
password manager to submit username and password to the website accurately
and reliably, without any guesswork39. The website only needs to annotate the
HTML of its login page, without changing any of its back-end logic; in return, by
becoming password-manager friendly, the website improves its security. There is
still the security problem, though, that the password is generated by the user
(even though the user no longer needs to remember it) and therefore is probably
vulnerable to a guessing attack.
Level 2. To counter that additional problem we specified an extra step in
PMF whereby the website allows password-manager-created passwords without
imposing its customary composition policy on them (uppercase, lowercase, sym-
bols, digits etc) provided that they are at least t characters long40, on the basis
that only software agents, not humans, will ever use such extravagantly long
and hard-to-retype passwords. This strategy allows password managers, includ-
ing Pico, to generate for each account a distinct random password that will be
many orders of magnitude stronger than anything a human could reliably mem-
orize. This strategy requires a small change in the back-end logic of the website
(changing the password definition policy to consider any passwords of length t
and above as acceptable without checking what classes of characters they con-
tain) but enables security that effectively stops any offline guessing attacks. It
is assumed that the website salts and hashes the passwords and that therefore
an increase the length of the supplied password does not affect the per-account
storage cost of the credentials at the website.
Level 3. Architecturally, from the security viewpoint, it would be preferable
not to send the shared secret from client to website at every login but instead
to use a challenge-response protocol, as suggested for example by Bonneau [15].
Level 3 would allow for that. While not using public key cryptography per se,
it would require changing the back-end logic of the website from verifying a
password (salt, then hash, then compare against stored hash) to challenging
the client and verifying the response. Challenge-response may add an additional
message in the protocol, and thus additional communication delays; with care
one might try to optimize away the delays by serving the challenge at the same
time as the web page, but this might amount to an even more disruptive change
for websites.
Level 4. This level would provide mutual authentication, with the user only
supplying their own credentials after having verified the authenticity of the web-
site. In the previous “native Pico” implementation this was achieved with Sigma-I
[7], which uses public key cryptography. Using public keys as credentials and a
mutual authentication protocol was the original design of Pico [3], but this is
clearly the most disruptive solution of all for the website and therefore it is the
most damaging in terms of deployability for Pico.
39 As we said, HTML5 also supports similar annotations.
40 We suggested t = 64 characters taken at random from the base64 alphabet.
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5.2 And when the token is not available?
Unfortunately tamper-evident tokens may be lost or temporarily unavailable.
Imagine I receive a phone call while sailing on my yacht. My broker advises me
of a business opportunity that requires my digital signature. My signing token
is at home in a safe because I didn’t want to lose it at sea. There is insufficient
time either to collect the token or to deliver a replacement token before the
opportunity expires. This suggests that we want a mechanism that temporarily
relaxes the requirement for a tamper-evident token.
Fortunately my bank realises this may happen and values my custom. It can
establish a proxy service—a remote tamper-evident box—that I may use in such
circumstances. Having established my identity by phone they create a temporary
account for me on the proxy server which I use to authenticate the transaction.
There is a raised level of risk since I am now relying upon the security of my
phone which I use to access the proxy server, which is why I revert to using the
more secure physical token after I return home.
Since I know that my token is unattended while I am on holiday, I might even
ask the bank to disable it temporarily while I am away to reduce the impact if
it is stolen.
The research question for Pico is now how to offer this alternative while
respecting the primary directive of “you shall not be required to remember any
secrets in order to authenticate”.
5.3 How should Pico evolve?
The discussion that brought us to write this paper suggests that the security
gain from level 3 to level 4 is not significant, and that level 2 is more than strong
enough against the threat of offline guessing. Level 2 is also sufficient to offer the
desired property that a compromise of the credentials file at the website does
not require revocation of the client credentials41.
We therefore argue that levels 1 and 2 are the sweet spot that offers ade-
quately strong security at acceptable costs in deployability. We won’t be pushing
for levels 3 or 4 any more: we take level 2 as our new “native mode” for Pico and
support levels 0 and 1 as “compatibility mode”.
In summary, the Pico login credentials are no longer public/private keys42
but we continue to use public key technology implicitly insofar as the web relies
on TLS.
41 The website is able to distinguish machine-generated passwords by their length and
flag them as such in the hashed credentials file. The website is therefore in a posi-
tion not to bother those users with a password reset, since their password cannot
be realistically brute-forced from the hash even by an arbitrarily powerful offline
adversary.
42 They are instead t-character-long random sequences of base64 characters. With
t = 64 they are equivalent to 384-bit symmetric keys.
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6 Conclusions
Although our investigation started by looking at whether Pico really needed
to rely on public key cryptography to offer its desirable properties, we then
broadened the scope to investigate what web authentication might look like if it
had to work without public key technologies.
Reviving a discussion that was popular in the last decade of the past mil-
lennium, we noted once again that the alleged advantages of public key over
symmetric key for authentication don’t seem overwhelming when the opera-
tional need for revocation is taken into account. We also noted a posteriori that,
in the current TLS-based (and thus public-key based) web authentication sce-
nario, revocation essentially doesn’t work. Public key may have won on the web
in terms of deployment, but hasn’t really solved the problem. We argue that,
should quantum computers succeed in breaking public key cryptography43, we
could implement alternatives based on symmetric key technology that, though
imperfect, would offer comparable benefits and trade-offs when deployed in con-
junction with tamper-evident tokens such as Pico.
In particular, one desirable property of a public-key-based authentication
system is that users do not need to change their credentials, there or elsewhere,
if the website is compromised and its credentials file is stolen. We showed how
to achieve this result without using public key primitives.
Coming back to Pico, we had already gradually introduced a compatibility
mode that did not require public key cryptography (save for that implicit in
TLS). The above investigation prompted us to consider its trade-offs against
those of the public-key-based solution. We concluded that, given the ability of
the token to generate and define a strong random password for every account (as
enabled by PMF), the solution without public key offers comparable security but
much greater deployability, because it requires almost no changes on the back-
end. We have therefore made it our new native mode for Pico.
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